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Abstract—The allocation of common-pool resources is an im-
portant topic in technical and socio-technical systems, and
when left unmanaged, such systems often collapse to highly
unequal and unsustainable outcomes. Recent work has high-
lighted a role for electronic institutions in managing such
resources, to ensure socially-beneficial outcomes in the long
term. However, open self-organising multi-agent systems of-
ten involve agents that learn behaviours in order to meet
their goals. In this paper we explore the interplay between
institutional features and forms of social and asocial learning
employed by self-interested agents. We show that, while recent
results have associated social learning with sustainability, this is
sensitive to the form of social learning used. We show that more
realistic models that combine social and asocial learning are
more likely to lead to unsustainable institutions and anti-social
outcomes. However, a key role for pardons in the sanction
mechanism of the institution is identified, which allows for
tolerance of a range of behaviours associated with ongoing
learning, including complacency and exploration.
1. Introduction
This paper studies one case of the application of social
concepts in a technical system: the bottom-up formation and
sustenance of institutions for the collective and socially-
beneficial management of common-pool resources. Specifi-
cally, when an institution can be used to resolve a common-
pool resource problem in some socially-desirable way (e.g.,
fairly), we ask: under what conditions do agents learn to
comply with such an institution, and under what conditions
does such learning itself cause the institution to fail? We
consider this question in the case of different forms of purely
social learning, as well as a combined social/asocial case.
Recent work by Pitt et al. [1], [2] has shown that, when
faced with the problem of sustainable and fair common-pool
resource management in (socio-)technical systems, the pres-
ence of an electronic institution with the requisite features
for sustainability proposed by Ostrom [3] can avoid the free-
riding problem. Pitt proposed a computational formalisation
of Ostrom’s institutional requirements, which may be de-
signed in to the system. As they put it, in this case there
is “no need to ‘hope’ that an institution with the requisite
features for sustainable management would evolve” [2].
In open and heterogeneous technical and socio-technical
systems, however, can we do better than simply hoping a
collective of learning agents evolve a sustainable institution
for socially-beneficial common-pool resource allocation?
And if so, under what conditions does this happen?
This paper focusses on a common-pool resource appro-
priation problem, where agents have the ability to take a
desired amount of resource from a common pool, but do
so in a first-come-first-served manner. In this scenario, the
first agents (in our case, the order is fixed) have a greater
ability to take their desired amount, while later ones may be
unsatisfied. We are interested in how such a system might
self-organise to a more equal appropriation of the resource.
Therefore, how might this play out if instead agents’
compliance (or not) with the institution is learnt? How
do different forms of learning affect the sustainability of
an institution? In particular, we draw on understanding of
social learning behaviour in animals, where the common
assumption that claims learning by copying to be beneficial,
is known to be flawed [4]. Theoretical analyses show that
social learners have higher fitness than asocial learners only
when copying is rare. As copying increases, copiers copy
other copiers and the sampling of the environment by asocial
learners is low. It is suggested that individuals must be more
selective in their copying and perform asocial learning some
of the time. Further, “individuals appear to switch between
reliance on social and asocial sources of information in a
flexible and facultative manner” [5, p369]. Laland [4] in-
vestigates strategies that animals adopt for copying through
two aspects, the circumstances WHEN copying will happen
and WHO, the choice of individual from whom to learn.
Our results highlight an important interplay between the
institution’s rules and the agents’ learning behaviour. The
way in which agents learn has an impact on the existence
and sustainability of the institution. Conversely, the institu-
tion’s features can either tolerate or inhibit agent learning.
2. Problem Statement
In line with much work in multi-agent systems and the
study of the evolution of cooperation, we assume that the
system is defined by a population of agents, occupying some
common environment, and self-interest on the part of agents,
which may conflict with the group’s interests, such that this
encourages free riding. We consider the case when resources
are exogenous, i.e., they are provided by the environment
over time. An example of this is agents appropriating water
for their needs, from a reservoir [1]. The collective task
facing the agents is to allocate this resource among them.
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Figure 1. The operation of one round in our system
The included institutional principles [3] are:
1) Clearly defined boundaries: members can make de-
mands on resources and then appropriate them; (liv-
ing) non-member agents can appropriate resources.
2) Congruence between rules and the state of the
prevailing environment: the ration rule is applied,
where a member demanding more than its ration is
allocated its ration, whereas a member demanding
less than its ration will be allocated that.
3) Monitoring: the appropriation behaviour of a pro-
portion (10%) of living agents is monitored.
4) Graduated sanctions: monitored agents who are
caught not complying (i.e. appropriating more) are
sanctioned according to their status: their appropri-
ated amount is confiscated, and they are forbidden
from demanding for increasing amounts of time,
ultimately leading to a permanent ban / death.
When institution also pardons agents, each sanction
level expires after a period of time (10 rounds).
We consider a scenario based on [1], [3] as illustrated in
Figure 1. A round starts by agents making their requests,
followed by the institution making allocations using a ration
rule, and the agents appropriating in a first-come-first-served
manner, as determined by their individual compliance. Mon-
itoring of compliance takes place next: when a monitored
agent is caught not complying, graduated sanctions are
applied. If the institution contains the pardon rule, expired
sanctions are removed. In the learning scenarios, remaining
live agents then learn according to the social/asocial strategy.
Finally, live agents adapt their demand for the next round
following a simple rule, whereby when the appropriated
amount equals the demand, the demand is slightly increased
for the next round with a small probability (0.1), otherwise
the demand is similarly reduced with the same probability.
The problem is then to establish (1) the need for an
institution under which there is an equitable appropriation
in the long term, (2) the conditions under which agents learn
to comply with such an institution, and (3) the conditions
under which learning causes the institution to fail.
3. Approach
We investigate the WHEN and the HOW of learning, the
WHO for social learning and the probability of compliance
at the start of the system. The factors and levels of our full
factorial experiment are summarised below (HOW and WHO
are not applicable for WHEN is Never):
Factor Level
Institution None, No pardons, With pardons
WHEN Never, All, If dissatisfied
HOW Social, Social and Asocial
WHO Majority, Satisfied
Starting compliance 0, 0.1, 0.9, 1
The types of studied learning strategies are motivated by
ethology [4], [5]. We study conformity-biased social learn-
ing equivalent to always copy-majority, as well as copy-
satisfied-if-dissatisfied, based on the combination of “copy
successful individual”, “copy if better” and “copy if dis-
satisfied” strategies. Instead of considering the level of
success of another agent we use its satisfaction. For asocial
learning, we apply exploration via simple mutation. We
apply a simple model to incorporate both social and asocial
learning in the system: when an agent is dissatisfied with
the appropriation, social or asocial learning are adopted with
equal chance. Social learning involves modifying ones own
strategy towards that of satisfied agents and asocial learning
mutates ones strategy by a fixed amount in either direction.
The tracking of resource level over the long term allows
us to observe the current amount of unappropriated resource.
The number of members and living agents provide evidence
for the sustainability or otherwise of the institution. The
number of satisfied agents and mean compliance probability
allow us to establish whether and what learning took place.
For measuring how equitable the different scenarios are, we
employ the Gini coefficient [6], which is commonly used
in economics to express the inequalities in the wealth of a
population (a value of zero indicates perfect equality and 1
corresponds to maximal inequality).
 0
 1x106
 2x106
 3x106
 4x106
 5x106
 6x106
 0  800  1600  2400  3200  4000
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
R
es
ou
rc
e 
le
ve
l
Ag
en
t p
ro
po
rti
on
 / 
G
in
i c
oe
ffi
cie
nt
Time
Satisfied agents
Resource level
Gini coefficient
Figure 2. Effect of self-interested agent behaviour in the first-come-first-
served exogenous resource appropriation scenario. Once the initial resource
store is depleted, the appropriation per round becomes increasingly unequal.
912
 0
 1x106
 2x106
 3x106
 4x106
 5x106
 6x106
 0  800  1600  2400  3200  4000
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
R
es
ou
rc
e 
le
ve
l
Ag
en
t p
ro
po
rti
on
 / 
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y 
/ G
in
i c
oe
ffi
cie
nt
Time
Living agents
Satisfied agents
Members
Resource level
Gini coefficient
Mean compliance probability
(a) Non-Compliant
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(b) Non-Compliant
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(c) Probability of Compliance 0.9
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(d) Probability of Compliance 0.9
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(e) Fully Compliant
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(f) Fully Compliant
Figure 3. Fixed probability of compliance, no learning. The institution does not pardon; sanctions remain on the agents’ permanent record. Unless there
is full compliance by all agents, the institution removes and then eliminates its members, and thus collapses. Almost all cases lead to a highly unequal
distribution of resources; only with full compliance is a more equal allocation achieved. Low probabilities were similar to non-compliance.
4. Results
Our first result, in Figure 2, shows the outcome with
no institution. Hence there is no allocation made, no notion
of compliance or strategy to learn. Agents take what they
desire, and adapt their demand based on what they can get
away with appropriating. Here, the early agents learn that
they can take as much as they desire, and according to the
demand adaptation mechanism (adopted from Pitt et al. [1])
soon realise they can appropriate the entire pool. Finally,
the first agent adapts to take everything, and all others are
left with zero; the Gini coefficient is approaching 1.
4.1. Static Probabilistic Compliance
Next, we consider stationary fixed and probabilistic
compliance strategies. Figure 3 shows short and long term
outcomes for varying compliance probabilities, without par-
dons. Figure 4 shows the same when pardons are present. In
each case, every agent in the population was given the same
probability (though of course their manifested behaviour
varies). In all cases with low or zero compliance, the institu-
tion sanctioned and ultimately eliminated the agents, leading
to a highly unequal allocation, akin to that in Figure 2.
Conversely, with full compliance, we unsurprisingly see no
sanctions and an equal appropriation of resource maintained.
Of particular interest is the 0.9 probability case, in compar-
ing Figures 3c and 3d with Figures 4c and 4d, respectively.
This shows the effect of the presence of pardons on a
group, where each agent is likely to comply but not certain
to. As discussed by Petruzzi et al. [7], forgiveness on the
part of agents can enable a society to tolerate occasional
infractions. Here, pardons can be seen as a mechanism for
the codifying of forgiving behaviour within the institution.
A high level of membership is therefore sustained, leading
to the appropriation remaining highly equal.
4.2. Impact of Different Forms of Social Learning
Next we consider the effect of social learning of com-
pliance probabilities. Figure 5 shows that sustainability is
achieved with copy-majority learning, as all agents copy
compliance behaviour until they have converged. This holds
regardless of the initial probability, as agents learn by imitat-
ing even unintended apparent compliance when the resource
923
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(a) Non-Compliant
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(b) Non-Compliant
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(c) Probability of Compliance 0.9
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(d) Probability of Compliance 0.9
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(e) Fully Compliant
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(f) Fully Compliant
Figure 4. Fixed probability of compliance, no learning. The institution’s sanctions includes a pardon mechanism, whereby they expire after 10 rounds of
not being observed to not comply. Following this, the agent return to the previous sanction level. Low probabilities were similar to non-compliance.
is plentiful. This aligns with similar results by Pitt et al. [8].
By contrast, the copy-satisfied-if-dissatisfied learning rule
captures complacency of satisfied agents, who, due to their
satisfaction, do not change their strategy. In this case, the
institution is not sustained at the same level, particularly
without pardons, as it is not tolerant of members who have
not yet learned to behave in a socially beneficial way. The
key messages from this result are that i) the form of social
learning impacts on the sustainability of the institution, and
ii) pardons can mitigate this, to an extent.
4.3. Mixed Social and Asocial Learning
Finally, we turn to the yet more realistic [5] model of
learning, which combines both social and asocial aspects,
and unlike the purely social variants, contains exploratory
behaviour. Figure 6 shows the outcome of using this learning
rule both with and without pardons. These results clearly
show that without pardons in the institution’s sanctions,
this exploratory behaviour is not tolerated, as it is man-
ifested as non-compliance. Thus, the institution collapses
relatively quickly, and the distribution of resources becomes
highly unequal. On the other hand, when the institution
pardons sufficiently, ongoing exploratory asocial learning is
tolerated. Hence, both the institution and the exploratory
asocial learning remain sustainable in the long term and
also the distribution of resources remains highly equitable.
Note that even in Figure 6h, the institution is not sustained
forever. Eventually agents will get unlucky enough cross the
institution’s tolerance threshold, and will be eliminated. In
this experiment, agents were initially eliminated at roughly
a rate of one agent per five million rounds.
5. Conclusions and Future Work
This paper studies a first-come-first-served common-
pool resource appropriation problem. We exposed an inter-
play between pardons in the sanction mechanism, and forms
of social and asocial learning used by agents. We showed
that the way agents learn has a direct impact on the existence
and sustainability of the institution, and at the same time,
the institution’s features can either tolerate or inhibit agent
learning. Exploration and complacency are shown to be key
behaviours that institutions may need to explicitly tolerate,
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(a) Starting probability 0.1. No pardons. Copy-
majority.
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(b) Starting probability 0.1. With pardons. Copy-
majority.
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(c) Starting probability 0.9. No pardons. Copy-
majority.
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(d) Starting probability 0.9. With pardons. Copy-
majority.
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(e) Starting probability 0.1. No pardons. Copy-
satisfied-if-dissatisfied.
 0
 1x106
 2x106
 3x106
 4x106
 5x106
 6x106
 0  800  1600  2400  3200  4000
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
R
es
ou
rc
e 
le
ve
l
Ag
en
t p
ro
po
rti
on
 / 
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y 
/ G
in
i c
oe
ffi
cie
nt
Time
Living agents
Satisfied agents
Members
Resource level
Gini coefficient
Mean compliance probability
(f) Starting probability 0.1. With pardons. Copy-
satisfied-if-dissatisfied.
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(g) Starting probability 0.9. No pardons. Copy-
satisfied-if-dissatisfied.
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(h) Starting probability 0.9. With pardons. Copy-
satisfied-if-dissatisfied.
Figure 5. 5a–5d: All agents modify their strategy each round to behave more like the observed majority behaviour. 5e–5h: The copy-satisfied-if-dissatisfied
social learning rule means agents who appropriate their desired amount were “complacent”, and did not learn in that round. This can lead to institutional
collapse to varying degrees, especially when the initial probability of compliance is low, and/or without pardons.
and we identify a key role for pardons in the institution’s
sanction mechanism in doing so. Pardons allow the insti-
tution to tolerate complacency and exploration, which are
behaviours associated with ongoing learning.
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(a) Starting probability 0.1.
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(b) Starting probability 0.1.
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(c) Starting probability 0.9.
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(d) Starting probability 0.9.
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(e) Starting probability 0.1. With pardons.
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(f) Starting probability 0.1. With pardons.
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(g) Starting probability 0.9. With pardons.
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Figure 6. Agents use both social and asocial learning when dissatisfied. Sanctions are graduated, and in 6e to 6h they additionally contain pardons.
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